Attorney General’s delay to granting a fiat impacts the interests of justice

His Majesty’s Senior Coroner for West Yorkshire (Western District)  [2025] EWHC 1672 (Admin) 3 July 2025. Judgment here

This Divisional Court judgment recounts what should have been a completely uncontroversial application under s.13 Coroners Act 1988 for a fresh inquest.   Some highly relevant evidence had come to light which was not before the Coroner at the first inquest. Once made aware of the new information the Coroner understandably took the view that this new evidence would likely lead to a different inquest conclusion.

What makes this simple and uncontested case rather remarkable is how long it has taken for the right thing to happen and for an order for a fresh inquest to be made. The new evidence was discovered and put before the Coroner within six months of the initial inquest concluding.  Yet it was a further six years before that fresh inquest could be granted by the High Court.

Most (but by no means all) of the delay seems to have been occasioned by delays at the Attorney General’s office.  This so concerned  the Divisional Court that their Lordships announced at the end of their judgment that the Court would be sending a copy of their judgment to the Attorney-General himself, so he might be aware of the Court’s view that the delay in granting the Coroner’s request for a fiat would not only have caused further unnecessary anxiety to the deceased’s family, but may have had an adverse impact on the quality of the evidence available at the fresh inquest that is yet to be held.

Baron Hermer may now be rather peeved to be receiving a nudge from the High Court about something that was clearly not his own doing – but if the judicial nudge results in s.13 fiat applications being speeded up in future this can only be a good thing.

What next if the Attorney General refuses a fiat to seek a fresh inquest?

R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General of England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin) 1 July 2025 (judgment here)

Anyone wanting the High Court to quash a finding made at an inquest and order a fresh investigation and inquest under s.13 of the Coroners Act 1988 will need the approval (a fiat) of the Attorney General to proceed with their claim.  What then is the position if the Attorney General refuses to give that approval? is that the end of the road? or can the Attorney General’s refusal be challenged by judicial review?

This was the question a Divisional Court bench[1] grappled with in this factually rather remarkable case. The judgment deals only with the preliminary issue of the justiciability of a decision of the Attorney General to refuse his authority to bring an application under s.13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 (it only lightly touches on the merits of the application itself). The court’s judgment takes us on an interesting historical journey through the Attorney General’s gatekeeping function in a variety of settings. At the end you will hear that gate clang shut on the Claimant: the refusal of a fiat is not judicially reviewable [2]. However, your blogger suspects there may be another instalment to come, and so that clanging gate may not yet be firmly locked and bolted.

Resuming an inquest (or not) after a homicide trial

R(Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin) 30 June 2025 (judgment here)

Once the investigative obligation under Article 2 ECHR is engaged an inquest will most often be the means by which the state will satisfy the procedural obligations that follow. However in situations where the inquest has been suspended due to a homicide trial then the Coroner considering whether to resume an inquest will always need to consider whether other investigative procedures of the state that have already been conducted have, collectively, satisfied the requirements of the procedural obligation.

The principles of law involved are now relatively clear. The Art.2 procedural obligation requires a state, of its own motion, to carry out an investigation into a death that: (i) has a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results; (ii) is conducted by a tribunal that is independent of the state agents who may bear some responsibility for the death; (iii) allows the relatives of the deceased to play an appropriate part in it; and (iv) is prompt and effective.

The more difficult question is how to apply that law in practice, when each case must be looked at on its own unique facts. As readers of this blog will know, in Silvera the pre-inquest investigations had not been enough.  In Grice there had already been sufficient independent examination of state shortcomings for the Art.2 obligations to have been satisfied without an inquest.

This recent High Court decision adds some more colour to the complex picture. There is not really any new law here, but there is a helpful insight into how the court might approach the issue when a Coroner declines to hold an Art.2 inquest, believing enough has already been done.

Sharing skeleton arguments and written submissions at inquests

R (Metropolitan Police Commissioner) v Police Conduct Panel [2025] EWHC 1462 (Admin)  17 June 2025,  judgment here

Skeleton arguments and written submissions are often emailed to coroners in advance of an inquest or PIRH.  The document is rarely read out in court in full, and so any press or public sitting in court may find the resulting arguments extremely difficult to understand or follow when only partial extracts from the written document are elliptically referred to in oral submissions.

In such circumstances how are those who are entitled to attend the open public inquest hearing supposed to understand the arguments relied upon by the different interested persons or to make sense of the coroner’s ruling on a relevant matter?

This recent decision by Fordham J, reminds us that, whatever the forum, open justice requires judges and tribunals to ordinarily make skeleton arguments relied upon at a public hearing available to the press promptly if requested at that hearing.  To do so promotes open justice, as to both public scrutiny and intelligibility. It also promotes contemporaneous reporting and public confidence.

Making matters worse: the scope of police responsibility for a death

Tindall and another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33, (judgment here)

It is not coronial law under the microscope here, but rather a decision from the Supreme Court at the end of last year in a police civil action.  Nevertheless it provides helpful insight into the potential responsibility of police forces in their deployment to incidents that coroners and inquest practitioners will need to bear in mind should  a neglect or gross negligence manslaughter/unlawful killing conclusion be under consideration.

The Supreme Court was concerned with the test for the imposition of a duty of care in a civil claim for compensation.  The Court considered the elusive dividing line between ‘failing to protect a person from harm’ (where no duty of care arises) and ‘making matters worse’ (when a duty does bite). The Court acknowledged that drawing this distinction is “not always straightforward” [1] – which is perhaps something of an under-statement!