Revised Chief Coroner’s Guidance 17 on Conclusions and Law Sheet 1: Unlawful Killing

Revised Chief Coroner’s Guidance 17: Conclusions & Revised Law Sheet No. 1: Unlawful Killing

As the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Maughan v HM Senior Coroner Oxfordshire [1] were contemplated in the coronial world,  the Chief Coroner promulgated specific legal guidance on how to tackle the new civil standard of proof for unlawful killing (see Law Sheet 6). However that January 2021 guidance has now been formally withdrawn and replaced with revised versions of the pre-existing guidance on narrative and short-form conclusions and an updated law sheet specific to the unlawful killing conclusion.

Amendments were needed as before Maughan was determined it was generally understood that the criminal standard of proof applied to conclusions of suicide and unlawful killing. As the Supreme Court in Maughan has made clear, there is now only one standard of proof in inquests – the balance of probabilities.

Precedent and Article 2: Just because a different coroner wasn’t challenged doesn’t mean they were right

Dove v Assistant Coroner for Teesside [2021] EWHC 2511(Admin), 17.9.2021

This latest Divisional Court lesson on Article 2 ECHR not only provides a helpful summary excursion through the principles to apply when establishing whether the state’s obligations to protect life are engaged (or not) but it also takes the reader back to basics on the doctrine of precedent.

That another coroner elsewhere had determined that Art 2 rights were engaged in very similar circumstances to the present case was not helpful to the Divisional Court when considering whether Art 2 applied to the death now under consideration. The Claimant’s reference to an interim direction of the previous Chief Coroner in the Fishmongers Hall Inquests was also of no avail, given that decisions of earlier coroners are not binding on, or even persuasive, in the High Court.

In Dove the Claimant drew the High Court’s attention to an earlier decision by a different Assistant Coroner in a different part of the country to bolster the submission that the Assistant Coroner for Teesside had fallen into error. The Divisional Court was having none of it. Mrs Justice Farbey made short shrift of such an approach, pointing out that it did not advance the Claimant’s submission one jot to put a series of conclusions reached by other coroners in a number of different inquests before the Court.

The principle of stare decisis requires that all lower courts should make decisions consistent with previous decisions of higher courts – certainly not the other way round. The decisions of other coroners cannot be deployed to persuade the High Court (or even a fellow coroner in a different inquest) to tread a new path, rather than to follow established and binding case law on Article 2. When considering whether the state’s duty to protect life is engaged towards people who are not under state control (which was a key issue here) then application of the judgment of Supreme Court in Rabone [1] will be a far more fruitful place to focus attention.

Article 2, Arguability and Automatic Cases

R (Morahan) v HM Coroner for West London [2021] EWHC 1603 (Admin) 11.6.21

Arguments about the application of Article 2 ECHR remain one of the most taxing legal issues in the coronial jurisdiction. That the European Convention was never intended to be applied as fixed black letter law, but to be an instrument open to judicial interpretation as views evolve as to what ‘Human Rights’ actually entail for the society of the day, means that the types of cases that might engage the Art 2 investigative obligations in coroners’ courts will never be fixed. It is, therefore, unsurprising that cases exploring the engagement of Art 2 obligations in inquests seem to make their way to the High Court every six months or so, as one coroner or another ‘takes one for the team’ to help us all understand the current position in law.

Morahan is now the latest “cut out and keep” judgment for anyone wishing to get up to speed on the current state of the law with regard to Art 2 and the scope of the positive operational and the enhanced investigative Art 2 duties. In Morahan the Divisional Court has very helpfully examined Art 2 in detail, providing a summary guide to the recent key cases on Art 2 in the context of the death of a voluntary psychiatric in-patient from an accidental overdose when on approved leave from hospital.

Correlation does not imply causation

R (Wandsworth) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner West London [2021] EWHC 801 (Admin)

Most coroners won’t see any need to take extra care round a swimming pool when a Nicholas Cage film is about to be released, even given the clear relationship between one of Hollywood’s most prolific star’s film appearances and the number of people who die by drowning (see here). Nevertheless, in this recent Judicial Review case, the High Court have felt the need to remind coroners of the important principle in coronial law (sadly without any reference to Mr Cage) that correlation is not proof of causation.

The fact someone lived in a place where asbestos was present was not sufficient to establish that their fatal mesothelioma was caused by inhaling fibres from that asbestos. More is needed before a Coroner can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that a potential exposure to asbestos has more than minimally, negligibly or trivially contributed to a death. That the deceased was possibly exposed to asbestos at a particular address, and that asbestos is very often the cause of the mesothelioma that killed them cannot justify an inquest conclusion that asbestos exposure caused the death.

Post-inquest allegations of foul play must have some foundation

Farrell v Senior Coroner North East Hampshire [2021] EWHC 778 (Admin) 30.3.21

In this strongly worded dismissal of a s.13 application the Divisional Court (including the new Chief Coroner) were perhaps signalling to Coroners that, whilst there may be an understandable wish to placate the bereaved, detailed consideration should be given before lending one’s support to an application for a fiat for a fresh inquest. A fresh inquest cannot be justified simply to allay concerns of a member of the bereaved family, particularly where a reinvestigation would cause unwarranted distress to another.

When a family member raised suspicions of foul play – albeit with no real evidence in support – the Senior Coroner positively supported the application to the Attorney General for a fiat to apply to quash his documentary inquest into a mesothelioma death.[1] That stance was likely to have been influential in the fiat being given.

The Divisional Court have, however, now roundly dismissed the subsequent s.13 application on numerous grounds. Not only because of the lack of any evidence of the foul play being alleged, but importantly also noting that:

  • A fresh inquest would cause cost and delay to the coroner’s service.
  • It would divert the health professionals involved away from their public service by requiring preparation for and attendance at a hearing.
  • The interests of justice do not require a family member be given a platform to air unjustified suspicions.