Mays v HM Senior Coroner for Kingston Upon Hull & the East Riding of Yorkshire EWHC (Admin)

Witnesses often solemnly, sincerely and truly stumble over the words of the affirmation or oath.  Indeed many may wonder why it is that, when already feeling anxious at being placed in such an unfamiliar situation, they have to start the process of speaking out loud in a courtroom with such a tricky tongue twister. But the witnesses’ vow is much more than some archaic linguistic formality. This solemn promise to tell the whole truth, and not just the parts you want to reveal, sits at the very heart of our coronial inquisitorial system. It is why it should be an obvious golden rule for every witness at every inquest that if you have any question at all in your mind whether or not you should tell the Coroner about some potentially relevant facts, then just speak up.

The Coroner will be best placed to decide if something is or is not relevant and material to their investigation.  As this Divisional Court decision now underlines in red, asking other colleagues what to do and then following their misplaced advice that you need not reveal the full story to the Coroner, is unlikely to be the right course.

Revised Chief Coroner’s Guidance 17: Conclusions & Revised Law Sheet No. 1: Unlawful Killing

As the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Maughan v HM Senior Coroner Oxfordshire [1] were contemplated in the coronial world,  the Chief Coroner promulgated specific legal guidance on how to tackle the new civil standard of proof for unlawful killing (see Law Sheet 6). However that January 2021 guidance has now been formally withdrawn and replaced with revised versions of the pre-existing guidance on narrative and short-form conclusions and an updated law sheet specific to the unlawful killing conclusion.

Amendments were needed as before Maughan was determined it was generally understood that the criminal standard of proof applied to conclusions of suicide and unlawful killing. As the Supreme Court in Maughan has made clear, there is now only one standard of proof in inquests – the balance of probabilities.

Dove v Assistant Coroner for Teesside [2021] EWHC 2511(Admin)

This latest Divisional Court lesson on Article 2 ECHR not only provides a helpful summary excursion through the principles to apply when establishing whether the state’s obligations to protect life are engaged (or not) but it also takes the reader back to basics on the doctrine of precedent.

That another coroner elsewhere had determined that Art 2 rights were engaged in very similar circumstances to the present case was not helpful to the Divisional Court when considering whether Art 2 applied to the death now under consideration. The Claimant’s reference to an interim direction of the previous Chief Coroner in the Fishmongers Hall Inquests was also of no avail, given that decisions of earlier coroners are not binding on, or even persuasive, in the High Court.

In Dove the Claimant drew the High Court’s attention to an earlier decision by a different Assistant Coroner in a different part of the country to bolster the submission that the Assistant Coroner for Teesside had fallen into error. The Divisional Court was having none of it. Mrs Justice Farbey made short shrift of such an approach, pointing out that it did not advance the Claimant’s submission one jot to put a series of conclusions reached by other coroners in a number of different inquests before the Court.

The principle of stare decisis requires that all lower courts should make decisions consistent with previous decisions of higher courts – certainly not the other way round. The decisions of other coroners cannot be deployed to persuade the High Court (or even a fellow coroner in a different inquest) to tread a new path, rather than to follow established and binding case law on Article 2. When considering whether the state’s duty to protect life is engaged towards people who are not under state control (which was a key issue here) then application of the judgment of Supreme Court in Rabone [1] will be a far more fruitful place to focus attention.

R (Wandsworth) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner West London [2021] EWHC 801 (Admin)

Most coroners won’t see any need to take extra care round a swimming pool when a Nicholas Cage film is about to be released, even given the clear relationship between one of Hollywood’s most prolific star’s film appearances and the number of people who die by drowning (see here). Nevertheless, in this recent Judicial Review case, the High Court have felt the need to remind coroners of the important principle in coronial law (sadly without any reference to Mr Cage) that correlation is not proof of causation.

The fact someone lived in a place where asbestos was present was not sufficient to establish that their fatal mesothelioma was caused by inhaling fibres from that asbestos. More is needed before a Coroner can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that a potential exposure to asbestos has more than minimally, negligibly or trivially contributed to a death. That the deceased was possibly exposed to asbestos at a particular address, and that asbestos is very often the cause of the mesothelioma that killed them cannot justify an inquest conclusion that asbestos exposure caused the death.