This specialist one-day advocacy training course is presented by The Centre for Contemporary Coronial Law at the University of Greater Manchester

Wednesday 4 September 2025

In person venue: Army & Navy Club, Central London and online
Click here for full details or Click here to book

This highly practical course is designed for barristers and solicitors representing families, public bodies, or other interested persons at inquests.  The interactive session focuses on improving your advocacy skills in the unique context of the Coroners Court.

What you’ll gain:

• Insights from specialist counsel and senior coroners
• Strategies for effective written and oral advocacy
• Guidance on ethical and procedural challenges
• Tips for persuasive submissions and witness handling

 Expert speakers include:

• Professor Christopher Dorries OBE– Retired Senior Coroner, South Yorkshire (West), author of ‘Coroners’ Courts – A Guide to Law & Practice’
• Dr Bridget Dolan KC– Barrister and Assistant Coroner in West Sussex, Brighton & Hove and Jersey.
• Mr Tim Brennand– HM Senior Coroner, Manchester West

A 50% discount on course fees is offered  to all coroners, barristers and solicitors (inc pupils and trainees), COASA members and those employed by the NHS: for full eligibility for discount see full details here.

R (Ferguson) v  HM Assistant Coroner for Sefton, Knowsley & St Helens and the Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2025] EWHC 1901 (Admin) 23 July 2025 –  judgment here

Q1: What strength of evidence will make it arguable that an article 2 duty has arisen and/or make it arguable that a duty has been breached, so as to trigger an Art 2 compliant inquest?

Q2: For a mandatory jury to be required need there be an inappropriate act or omission by police, or is their mere involvement enough?

The answer to both these questions is now clarified in this latest Judicial Review decision from the High Court which underlines how, in respect of the “low arguability threshold” for Art 2 engagement, low really does mean low. But, before any commentary, first a confession: this blogger could not stop herself fangirling Mrs Justice Hill as she read through this judgment.  It is a beautiful exposition of how to write a clear and accessible judgment.  It is long, at 46 pages, as Hill J is no slouch and the factual analysis is quite detailed. But her Ladyship’s “Article 2 in overview” section (see paras 14-37) is as clear an exposition of the relevant law on the engagement of Art 2 procedural duties as you will find anywhere. Indeed, inquest practitioners might as well just copy and paste the text into their skeleton arguments (or coroners into their own judgments) to save themselves a lot of time,  as it is really not worth trying to explain this complex law any more succinctly than you will find in Hill J’s 23 neat paragraphs. It would be ridiculously presumptuous for this blog to even try to summarise it any further, beyond noting that Hill J clarifies that the low threshold of ‘arguability’ which will engage the procedural Art 2 duty applies not only to the question of any breach of a substantive art 2 duty, but also to whether any duty arises in the first place.

The meat of this case is, as with many cases, the application of the law to the unique facts and looking at whether the coroner had correctly applied that low arguability threshold in coming to his decision.

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R (Drysdale) v HMAC Manchester (South) [2025] EWHC 1850 (Admin) 18 July 2025, judgment here

To what extent an inquest must investigate possible causes of death is often a perplexing question. Until oral evidence is explored in a hearing it may not be known whether a possibility will crystallise into probability and so lend itself to a meaningful inquest conclusion.  In this case the criticism levelled at the coroner was that he had prevented some questioning of an expert and so not permitted relevant possibilities to be explored.

Although there was some limited research evidence supporting a possible correlation between the prescription of an anti-psychotic drug and the development of fatal leukaemia, the judge was not persuaded the coroner had been wrong when he exercised his r.19(2) power.

Once the expert had confirmed the evidence of a causative association was scant, the Area Coroner had been correct to prevent additional questioning on the issue.  There could not have been any meaningful inquest conclusion based on the expert evidence, since it revealed no more than a theoretical possibility which could not support factual or legal causation.

His Majesty’s Senior Coroner for West Yorkshire (Western District)  [2025] EWHC 1672 (Admin) 3 July 2025. Judgment here

This Divisional Court judgment recounts what should have been a completely uncontroversial application under s.13 Coroners Act 1988 for a fresh inquest.   Some highly relevant evidence had come to light which was not before the Coroner at the first inquest. Once made aware of the new information the Coroner understandably took the view that this new evidence would likely lead to a different inquest conclusion.

What makes this simple and uncontested case rather remarkable is how long it has taken for the right thing to happen and for an order for a fresh inquest to be made. The new evidence was discovered and put before the Coroner within six months of the initial inquest concluding.  Yet it was a further six years before that fresh inquest could be granted by the High Court.

Most (but by no means all) of the delay seems to have been occasioned by delays at the Attorney General’s office.  This so concerned  the Divisional Court that their Lordships announced at the end of their judgment that the Court would be sending a copy of their judgment to the Attorney-General himself, so he might be aware of the Court’s view that the delay in granting the Coroner’s request for a fiat would not only have caused further unnecessary anxiety to the deceased’s family, but may have had an adverse impact on the quality of the evidence available at the fresh inquest that is yet to be held.

Baron Hermer may now be rather peeved to be receiving a nudge from the High Court about something that was clearly not his own doing – but if the judicial nudge results in s.13 fiat applications being speeded up in future this can only be a good thing.

R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General of England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin) 1 July 2025 (judgment here)

Anyone wanting the High Court to quash a finding made at an inquest and order a fresh investigation and inquest under s.13 of the Coroners Act 1988 will need the approval (a fiat) of the Attorney General to proceed with their claim.  What then is the position if the Attorney General refuses to give that approval? is that the end of the road? or can the Attorney General’s refusal be challenged by judicial review?

This was the question a Divisional Court bench[1] grappled with in this factually rather remarkable case. The judgment deals only with the preliminary issue of the justiciability of a decision of the Attorney General to refuse his authority to bring an application under s.13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 (it only lightly touches on the merits of the application itself). The court’s judgment takes us on an interesting historical journey through the Attorney General’s gatekeeping function in a variety of settings. At the end you will hear that gate clang shut on the Claimant: the refusal of a fiat is not judicially reviewable [2]. However, your blogger suspects there may be another instalment to come, and so that clanging gate may not yet be firmly locked and bolted.