Determining the scope of an Art 2 Inquest: the need for an arguable contribution

Written by: Bridget Dolan KC
Published: 28 January 2016

R (Speck) v HM Coroner for York & (1) NHS England (2) MEDACS (Interested Parties) [2016] EWHC 6 (Admin), [2016] 4 WLR 15

In a case which serves as a reminder that an inquest should not be seen as a substitute for a public inquiry, the Admin. Court has held that, where a coroner conducting an Art 2 inquest decides that a factor could not even arguably be said to have made any real contribution to the death, then there is no discretion, or indeed power, to investigate that issue. Coroners’ investigatory powers arise from their statutory duty under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.5 and their discretion is limited to investigating only those factors that might arguably have contributed to a death.

It would be “wrong in principle” to “go into issues of policy and resources with which an inquest should not be concerned”.

New Guidance No. 22 on PIRHs and revised Guidance No. 17 on Conclusions

Written by: Briony Ballard
Published: 20 January 2016

Today the Chief Coroner published new guidance on Pre-Inquest Review Hearings (PIRHs) and revised guidance on coroner’s conclusions (Guidance No.17 (as amended)).

The newly published guidance on PIRHs reaffirms the guidance already provided in the cases of: Brown v HM Coroner for Norfolk [2014] Inquest Law Reports 91, Shafi v HM Coroner East London [2015] Inquest Law Reports 154 and Fullick v HM Coroner for Inner London North [2015] EWHC 3522. It encourages: PIRHs in complex cases, circulating agendas in advance and, if relevant, advance notification of the coroner’s provisional views on the respective issues.

The amended guidance on conclusions addresses the sometimes hotly contested questions of (1) what, if any, difference remains in law between a non-Article 2 v. Article 2 conclusion (2) whether a non-Article 2 conclusion is permitted in law to be judgmental and (3) is the coroner’s power in an Article 2 inquest to leave to a jury, for the purposes of a narrative conclusion, possible circumstances restricted to only where those findings will assist the coroner in a PFD report?

When can a Coroner re-open their own decision to refuse to hold an inquest?

Written by: Bridget Dolan KC
Published: 8 January 2016

Flower v HM Coroner for Devon, Plymouth, Torbay and South Devon [2015] EWHC 3666 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 2221

In a welcome clarification of the extent of a Coroner’s powers to re-open an inquest after having decided not do so, the Divisional Court has confirmed that, where an investigation has been suspended pending criminal proceedings, and a Coroner has determined that it should not be re-opened, the Coroner is not functus officio and so can revisit and change their own decision. Indeed the High Court has no jurisdiction to order an inquest under s13(1)(b) Coroners Act 1988 in such circumstances.

There had been no inquest and hence there were no inquest findings to quash.

Inquest delay and damages

Written by: Bridget Dolan KC
Published: 18 December 2015

Re Jordan’s Applications for JR – Delay & Damages [2015] NICA 66

From the inquest that just keeps on giving a further judgment of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (‘NICA’) has been published concerning the award of damages under the Human Rights Act as compensation for the continued delays in bringing to a conclusion the (still unfinished) inquest into the death of Pearse Jordan who was shot by an RUC officer on the Falls Road in 1992.

“The investigation into the death of a close relative, impacts on the next of kin at a fundamental level of human dignity. It is obvious that if unlawful delays occur in an investigation into the death of a close relative that this will cause feelings of frustration, distress and anxiety to the next of kin”. -Stephens J

A huge number of legal decisions, including more than 25 Judicial Review applications have already arisen from the procedural inadequacies in investigating this death. In 2001 an award of £10,000 as compensation for the delay up to that point was made by the European Court in Strasbourg, which called into question whether the Northern Irish inquest system was, at the relevant time, structurally capable of providing for both speed and effective access for the deceased’s family.

The low threshold for calling a jury in police deaths

Written by: Jamie Mathieson
Published: 10 December 2015

R (Fullick) v HM Coroner for Inner London North [2015] EWHC 3522 (Admin)

Susan Jones died after falling ill at a police station after she had attended the station voluntarily as a witness. An alcoholic, homeless and on methadone, she was vulnerable and police statements made it clear that the officers felt they owed her a duty of care: as the Chief Coroner put it, “at the very least she needed looking after”. Having given an interview, Susan was waiting for a specialist team to attend. While waiting she placed her head on the table and appeared to fall asleep, being heard snoring. She was left for some time, checked once, but not roused. Nearly two hours later, officers realised she was not breathing. An ambulance was called and CPR commenced, but she died in hospital just over a week later.

The Coroner’s initial decision not to hold her inquest with a jury was overturned by the High Court, comprising the Chief Coroner and McCombe LJ.

‘Reason to suspect’ is a low and objective threshold: ‘suspect’ means suspicion: ‘a state of conjecture or surmise.’