Toogood v HM Senior Coroner for Somerset [2026] EWHC 634 (Admin) 17 March 2026, judgment here
Suicide is usually a covert act. In the absence of a final letter or a recent and clear declaration of suicidal feelings, there will often be no direct evidence of what the deceased intended by an action that sadly proves fatal. To what extent then might a coroner draw reasonable inferences from established facts, and decide that a deceased intended the natural and inevitable consequence of their actions?
This Judicial Review challenge grappled with the question of the inferences that can be permissibly drawn by a coroner where the deceased has made no statement of intent. Importantly, Sweeting J’s decision is the first since the Supreme Court decision in Maughan to confirm that earlier authorities, which stated that suicide could only be found if all other explanations had been excluded, are no longer good law. Those earlier cases hinged on the need to achieve a criminal level of certainty, which is no longer required for a finding of suicide.
Crucially, suicide still must not be presumed: there must be some evidential foundation for a conclusion of suicide. However, a coroner may draw inferences from circumstantial matters and is not confined to direct evidence. Indeed, suicide may be inferred from the mode of death alone. All that is required is a determination of what probably occurred based on the totality of the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may properly be drawn from it. As Sweeting J makes clear, a coroner is not obliged to exclude every alternative hypothesis, particularly speculative or remote ones, before coming to a suicide conclusion.
The Background
Mr Toogood, a retired farmer, was inside his locked house when he died from a head injury inflicted by the discharge of a shotgun beneath his chin. ‘Gun residue’, the remains of a propellant from the discharged cartridge, was found on his left hand. The pathologist’s opinion was that it ‘stretched possibility’ that this close contact wound could have been inflicted accidently by him tripping when carrying a loaded shotgun.
Mr Toogood had recently experienced a deterioration in his mood, identified by both his family and his GP. Although he had not expressed any suicidal thoughts to anyone, he had attended his GP reporting weight loss, anxiety and low mood. The GP prescribed antidepressant and anti-anxiety medication but post-mortem toxicology revealed that Mr Toogood had not recently taken this. He was not intoxicated with drugs or alcohol when he died, nor did he leave any final letter.
In response to the Claimant’s representations before her father’s inquest, the Coroner sought the opinion of a Consultant Psychiatrist, who reviewed the medical records and found no evidence that Mr Toogood was suffering with acute psychosis or mental incapacity at the material time.
Against that background the Senior Coroner returned a finding of suicide, determining that Mr Toogood probably shot himself, and inferring his intent to die from the factual and circumstantial evidence.
The Judicial Review challenge
The Claimant brought a Judicial Review claim, her case relying principally on two contentions: (1) that accidental discharge could not be ruled out; and (2) that Mr Toogood’s mental state may have deprived him of capacity or intention. The Claimant did not argue that the Coroner could positively find this had been an accident, but rather, given the absence of clear evidence, the Coroner should have returned a narrative conclusion – shotgun injury with intent unknown.
The Claimant identified several features alleged to be inconsistent with suicidal intent, including the absence of a final letter and evidence of her father’s ordinary activities shortly before his death, such as purchasing a lottery ticket. She suggested that her father might have loaded his weapon indoors because he intended to go into the yard to shoot a poisoned rat, rather than see it suffer, but had tripped in the hallway. The Claimant also submitted that there was ‘proper doubt’ as to whether her father had capacity at the time of his death, and as such the conclusion of suicide should not stand.
The judge, however, did not agree with the Claimant. He accepted the Coroner’s position that she had not simply presumed intent but had drawn reasonable inferences from established facts. The evidence before the Coroner was consistent with Mr Toogood placing the butt of the shotgun on the floor with the end of the barrel under his chin, held in his left hand, whilst he operated the trigger with his right hand. The Coroner’s findings appropriately drew on the totality of the evidence, including the deceased’s knowledge of and experience with firearms, the manner of the discharge, the deterioration in his mood, and the absence of any alternative non-speculative explanation.
The Coroner’s conclusion on intent rested in part on the inherent nature of the act itself. The discharging of a shotgun beneath the chin is, in ordinary human experience, an act whose natural consequence is likely to be fatal. It was reasonable to conclude that the deceased, by reason of his familiarity with firearms, would ordinarily have been aware that what he did would prove to be fatal. The Coroner had also considered the medical and psychiatric evidence, including the absence of any clinical signs of psychosis or intoxication, and concluded that the deceased retained the capacity to appreciate that consequence.
The judge agreed that these were matters of inference of the kind which coroners are routinely required to draw. In coming to her conclusion, the Coroner had to determine what probably occurred. Whilst she should, and did, consider the inherent likelihood of the competing explanations, she was not required to eliminate every alternative possibility and exclude every speculative or remote hypothesis raised by the Claimant.
The suicide conclusion was one open to the Coroner on the evidence: the claim was therefore dismissed.
Commentary
The judge provided resounding support for the Senior Coroner’s approach to the analysis of the evidence. Whilst speculation without any factual foundation would be impermissible, it is nevertheless permissible (and often necessary) for a coroner to draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances of a death, and to make logical deductions from accepted or proven facts.
Even in the absence of a prima facie statement of intent (such as leaving a final letter or making an oral declaration of suicidal intent to another person) a coroner is not confined to direct evidence, but is entitled to make a reasonable inference of intent from all the circumstantial evidence.
In drawing inferences, a coroner is conducting an evaluative process. Another person might draw different inferences from these same facts, but a coroner’s conclusion can only be challenged on the basis that no reasonable coroner could have reached the conclusion on the evidence. This is a high threshold that was easily surpassed by the Senior Coroner in this case. Importantly, the judge here has confirmed the long-standing principle: that suicide may be inferred from the mode of death alone, notwithstanding the absence of any other evidence of suicidal intent.
Lucy Barnard is a pupil in chambers
Bridget Dolan KC of Serjeants’ inn Chambers represented the Senior Coroner in this claim.