“Poor” but Not Negligent: Drawing the Line in Coroners’ Narrative Conclusions

R (Wells Rugby Football Club Ltd and Taunton Rugby Football Club Ltd) v HM Senior Coroner for Somerset [2026] EWHC (Oral Permission Hearing – Kimblin J):  28 April 2026 (an unapproved note of judgment is here)

The High Court’s refusal of permission in this recent case provides a useful reminder of how carefully coronial language is policed—and what room remains for evaluative description short of liability.

The case arose from a tragic incident in January 2020, when a spectator at youth rugby matches, was struck on the head by a ball during a warm-up. Because she suffered from aplastic anaemia, the injury had catastrophic consequences and she later died. Following an inquest, the Senior Coroner recorded a narrative conclusion: “Accidental death contributed to by poor supervision and spectator safety management.” 

The Rugby Clubs sought permission for judicial review, focusing in particular on the use of the word “poor”. Their primary submission was that this adjective crossed the statutory boundary in section 10(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, because  – so they argued – it appeared to determine civil liability.

If you find this Blog useful might you give up three cups of coffee?

Ths blog is and will always remain free to readers….but…

If you ever have found the blog posts we provide  interesting or useful we wondered if you might consider, just quietly, showing your gratitude for these free posts by (virtually) pulling a tenner out your back pocket and sponsoring the Chief Coroner, HHJ Alexia Durran,  who completed the london marathon in  5 hrs, 27mins and 36 secs  on 27th April – raising £19,300 for the Coroners Court Support Service.

Anyone who works in and around Coroners Courts will have met the excellent volunteers from the Coroners Court Support Service and come to appreciate the valuable work they do,  helping all those who attend at a Coroner’s Inquest.

Many people attend inquests without anyone with them who is familiar with courts or the inquest process.  Understandably they feel anxious about attending a court hearing, and perhaps particularly so where it involves listening to or talking about how someone died.

The Coroners Court Support Service is an independent voluntary organisation that provides trained volunteers to provide emotional and practical help to bereaved families, witness and others attending a coroner’s inquest. 

As a charity CCSS do not receive any central funding but rely upon grants and donations to carry out their esential work. 

CCSS’ vision is, and always has been, to set up the Service in all of the Coroners’ Courts within England and Wales to ensure bereaved families, witnesses and others have access to the Service wherever they attend an Inquest. They can not do so without our help.

It would be excellent to get HHJ Durran’s final total up to £20k and so there is still time for you to sponsor the Chief Coroner here…..

https://2026tcslondonmarathon.enthuse.com/pf/thechiefcoroner

 

If everyone who reads this blog regularly just handed over £10 – the price of 3 cups of coffee – then the Chief Coroner would smash her target.

 

Thank-you so much for any support you might offer to the CCSS and the encouragement you will give to HHJ Durran for making her way so quickly round the 27 mile course (and doing it without those clever shoes that Sabastian Sawe had)

One faulty cog or a malfunctioning machine? the ECHR systems duty in practice

R(AH) and R(IS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 3269 Admin,  judgment (15 December 2025) here

Article 2 ECHR encompasses a ‘systems duty’ which requires public bodies to protect all citizens by having both appropriate state regulation and functional procedures and policies in place to offer protection where life might otherwise be at risk. Spotting flaws in a system is an important exercise for inquest lawyers, as when death arises from an arguable breach of the systems duty this will trigger a ‘Middleton’ ‘Article 2 Inquest’.

However it can sometimes be tricky to spot whether what one is looking at is an error by an individual in how they have operated the system in question (which is not a systems breach), rather than a flawed or wholly absent system (which is).  Someone operating within an adequate well-functioning system and making a mistake (even a very bad one) is insufficient for a systems failure. A single cog failing to turn within an otherwise functional and well well-oiled machine will not reach the standard necessary to show a breach.

However, this judgment by Mrs. Justice Jefford might make you think again about when repeated individual failings might reveal more than someone simply having a bad day at work, but actually reveal that the system although capable of working effectively was not being implemented and so was not working effectively. Where the failure is not in the system’s design, but in ensuring the implementation of the system an ECHR systems breach may still be made out.

Complex medical evidence may well be helped by a list of issues (and a towel)

R (Olabode) v HM Area Coroner for Manchester City & Manchester University NHSF Trust (2026) EWHC 810,  2 April 2026, judgment here.

Coroners and inquest practitioners seeing this 31 page judgment land on a Maundy Thursday need not worry that they might now have a lot of reading to interrupt their Easter break.  Despite the lengthy, detailed and erudite judgment of Mrs Justice Hill this case does not develop coronial law one iota – it is a case uniquely confined to its facts.

But gosh! what an incredibly complex set of facts these were.   Indeed Hill J is rather playing down the intricate detail she had to grapple with when she opens her judgment saying that “this claim has involved the consideration of incredibly detailed expert evidence”.  There were eight experts from seven specialist medical disciplines who provided their views to the Coroner on cause of death and causation during the inquest under challenge.  Inevitably they did not all agree with each other: indeed they agreed and disagreed in different ways on different things. The medical evidence was so convoluted that those present in the Admin Court in Manchester last week report that a far more apt reference was made at the hearing to “needing a towel on the head” before one might even begin to understand it.

As anyone who was not born this century ought to know, a towel is of course about the most massively useful thing an interstellar hitchhiker can have.[1]  But happily you won’t need your own towel here, as Hill J has done all the hard work for you. Just jump to paragraph 113 to find the single learning point for coroners and inquest practitioners that comes out of this case, which is:

When inquest evidence is this complicated, and even if Art 2 is not engaged, it’s a jolly good idea for counsel to help out the coroner by proposing a list of key issues that the coroner should consider and cover off when coming to their findings of fact.

And then perhaps also join your blogger in celebrating the forensic analytical skills of both the Area Coroner for Manchester City and Hill J[2] next towel day, on 25 May (assuming there is no appeal, in which case three more towels will probably be needed).

When might a Coroner require an IP to hand over an expert report?

Drake’s Application for Judicial Review [2025] NIKB 70, 12 December 2025, judgment here.

It is clear that litigation privilege cannot arise in respect of reports commissioned for a coroner’s inquisitorial proceedings: the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICA) have already soundly dealt with that point.[1] Bound by House of Lords authority, the NICA held that if an expert report is obtained only for the purpose of an inquest, then no privilege will apply to it.

However, in Ketcher & Mitchell,[2] the NICA made it clear this was their extremely reluctant position. The court gave rather a strong steer that the position of a family who refuse to provide their own expert report to a coroner should usually prevail, even in the absence of privilege.

That position is now re-analysed in some detail in this more recent NI High Court decision.  McLaughlin J explains why the position is far more nuanced than Ketcher & Mitchell might suggest at first glance. There is no global principle of non-disclosure and the Coroner in Drake’s Application was entitled to require disclosure to her of a non-privileged expert report commissioned by the bereaved.

Although this case concerns Northern Irish Coronial legislation the disclosure principles discussed here are very likely to apply with equal force to the similarly worded provisions of schedule 5 CJA 2009 in England and Wales – making this case essential reading for anyone with an interest in how privilege and disclosure might operate in our Coroners Courts.